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ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR
RECREATIONAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF
STATE AGENCIES*
MICHAEL F. BREWERt and BETTY BORDNER +

Economic literature pertaining to the public development and
management of water, land, and other natural resources, customarily focuses on activities through which the resource in its natural
condition is modified or combined with other resources to yield
services and benefits that are considered to be the products of the
development and management processes. This reliance on the theoretical construct of the production function is a conditioned reflex
in the profession and facilitates the analyst in plying his trade in
familiar territory.
It is useful, however, to give a somewhat wider interpretation to
the notion of the production function, and in particular, to distinguish between physical activities and the planning and programming which precede them in most governmental bodies. The
planning and programming processes, together with implementative activities, collectively comprise a heuristic, aggregrative production function relating the public investment of capital and resources
to the final bundle of goods and services which they yield. Increasing
or altering the planning and programming processes can change
the position and shape of the associated supply function in a similar
fashion to the introduction of a technological innovation.
Considering natural resource development in this fashion suggests the value of systematically assessing the efficiency of the
planning and programming inputs. This requires that one view
natural resource development within a broader context than that
of an individual resource. Consider water for example: joint products, externalities affecting the productivity of other resources,
and substitutability among products-all reveal the need for a comprehensive multi-resource scope in the organizations participating
in the planning and programming processes. While this need is well

0 This study was assisted by the Water Resources Center, University of California. An earlier draft was presented to the Committee on the Economics of Water
Resources Development of the Western Agricultural Economics Research Council, San
Francisco, California, December 9, 1964.
t Professor of Economics, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
I Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle.
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known, and its absence in the governmental decision process is frequently lamented, little systematic investigation has been undertaken to discern the adequacy of existing organizational arrangements and to identify the implications of inadequacies in these arrangements for physical development projects that emerge from
them.
The present study attempts to suggest a type of investigation
that can fill this hiatus in the literature. Rather than focusing on a
particular resource, the central concern of this study is the decisionmaking mechanism at the level of state governments that promulgates and implements policies and programs through which recreational opportunities are made available to the general public. While
these decisions frequently involve water resources, they are not
necessarily limited thereto. Land resources-broadly interpreted
to include forests, wildlife, and range-also are involved. It is contended that for the purpose of identifying and analyzing organizational arrangements for the public development of natural resources, it is more useful to focus on a category of goods and services
produced rather than upon a particular element of the resources
input.
Historically, most governmental resource agencies have been
limited in initial scope to a particular resource. It is precisely this
legacy of single-resource orientation that has had to be overcome
in the contemporary drive for comprehensive resource planning.
The typical effort to accommodate this objective has been to create
a hierarchy of organizations which collectively contribute to the
type of comprehensive planning and programs sought. This hierarchy itself directly influences these processes, and warrants examination. A recent study by the United States Outdoor Recreation
Resources Review Commission (ORRRC) presents state organizational information that permits this type of analysis in the area
of recreation.
The purpose of the present study is to identify the specific activities or processes entailed in recreational resource management; to
determine the particular organizational arrangements through
which these activities take place, and to evaluate the typical state
organizations employed for these purposes in this country.'
1. This excludes consideration of management practices of many federal agencies
which are planned and implemented exclusively through federal organizations. However, to the extent that federal recreational agencies will devise and implement their
management program in close coordination with, or actually employing, the facilities
of the states, its efficiency is relevant.
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An initial objective is to clarify concepts and terms which permit
adequate identification of those activities comprising recreational
resource management. Once identified, particular organizations may
be studied to determine whether they possess the requisite attributes needed to carry out these activities efficiently.
Consideration will also be given to those public recreational
resources not within the discreet jurisdiction of a municipality,
county, or local public district. Ordinarily, responsibility for their
management is divided among a number of organizations which
are related to each other through a more or less formal hierarchy
of departments, commissions, or offices eventually responsible to
the governor or legislature of each state. This hierarchy of organizations exerts substantial influence on the management process
through constraints which it may impose upon the constituent organizations. The implications of these constraints are explored in the
following way: first, the structures of recreational agencies for
particular states are identified, classified, and evaluated in terms of
the way in which they perceive the objectives of recreational resource management and also in terms of the scope of jurisdiction
accorded them. Second, once identified, the influence of this organizational structure upon a constituent agency is assessed using criteria generally consistent with the notion of efficiency as construed
by welfare economics.
I
THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Because of the variety of definitions given in the literature for the
term "recreational resources," it is useful to specify the nature of
these resources and the processes through which they are rendered
capable of providing recreational experience.
Some authors have attempted to differentiate psychic and physical components of recreation, including among the final products:
anticipation, travel to and from the site, the recreational experience
itself, and fond afterthoughts.2 Others appear to assume that any
resource modified by the adjective "recreational" automatically
provides some public with recreation experiences, the anatomy of
which is not further investigated.' We take a middle-ground posi2. E.g., M. Clawson, Methods of Measuring the Demand for and Value of Outdoor
Recreation (Reprint No. 10, The Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future
1959).
3. E.g., L. Lerner, Quantitative Indices of Recreational Values Economics in Outdoor Recreational Policy (Report No. 11, committee on the Economics of Water Resources Development, Western Agricultural Economics Research Council 1962).
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tion, being concerned primarily with outdoor recreation requiring
land and/or water resources in the public domain. Emphasis is
placed on the efficiency with which component resources are managed rather than on the nature of the final output. However, we
cannot be overly cavalier in dispatching the identity of recreation,
for the relative attributes of the recreation we seek will determine
to a large extent the specific management program undertaken. For
present purposes, we assume recreation entails some degree of
"exclusiveness," requiring the elimination of competitive uses and
introducing a capacity notion into the production activities.
The terms "management" and "development," when applied to
recreation, often have been used interchangeably in the literature.
For present purposes they are distinguished in the following way:
recreational resource development denotes those activities increasing the potential capacity for recreational experience in selected
sites. 4 Recreational resource management, on the other hand, denotes those activities needed to realize the potential capacity of a
resource in terms of actual recreational use, which may be the only
use, or one of several potential uses, to which the resource can be
put.' With the basic distinction between management and development drawn, one may identify three general types of activity entailed in the management process: planning, programming, and
implementation.
The planning function involves information gathering, processing, and analysis, with the purpose of identifying principal management objectives. Programming entails the identification of alternative steps through which the objectives can be realized, selection of
the most efficient ones, and a determination of their staging for
implementation. Implementation involves actually undertaking the
programmed activities.
4. It is recognized that qualitative differences prevail in the field of recreation and

that heavy use of a given site may result in lower quality experience than would be
the case under more restricted use. The term "development" is neutral with respect
to recreational quality. That is, development may imply the creation of capacity for

recreation of a given quality when one previously existed, or it may imply the intentional shifting of recreational capacity from one qualitative category into another.
5. It is apparent that this is not an airtight definition and that overlap exists with
respect to actions that change the qualitative mix of recreational opportunities without
an overall capacity increase. These activities, such as more stringent admission policies

or the exclusion of particular types of recreational activity, are properly considered to
be management activities as long as they represent a reallocation of resources between
competing demands. In those instances where the demand for one quality of recreation

does not exist or is extremely low, a change in product mix increasing the capacity for
that quality recreation may be considered as a development activity.
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Both the planning and programming phases of the management
process involve analytical activities. The implementation of management measures entails concrete action, which may be considered
under three general headings: facility construction, maintenance, and
regulation. Carrying out construction requires the powers to contract
and secure funds to cover facility costs. Maintenance also implies
annual investment for facility upkeep and the ability to finance these
costs. Regulation implies the power to take necessary police actions.
While the authority for plan implementation can be readily identified and associated with a particular organization, this is not true
for the formulation and programming of management plans. Frequently, these plans represent the cumulative result of inputs and
constraints derived from various organizations in the particular administrative hierarchy of a given state.
Identifying the organizational structure as a variable for analysis
poses a methodological problem. One is forced to rely upon patterns evident in tables of organization expressing relationships
among constituent organizations. Actual performance obviously will
deviate from predictions based upon these formal relationships.
A complete economic appraisal of "structure" would entail the collection of performance data for each structural category, which is
beyond the scope of this study. A complete organizational structure comprises those entities with recreational resource management
missions responsible to the executive and/or legislative branches of
state government, their principal objectives, and their formal interrelationships.
The operation of a structure is difficult to specify, but it entails
the interrelationships between constituent organizations that "commonize" or build consistency into the objectives and policies of the
constituent agencies. This does not necessarily imply harmonious
interaction. When interagency planning is harmonious, the euphemism "coordinated plan" frequently is employed. When these
interactions entail disputes and acrimony, the structure may be unable to articulate specific management policies for implementation.
Nevertheless, there is a modicum of common agreement implicit
in common constraints on the activities of constituent agencies as
they pursue their respective tasks. Thus, even when a structure does
not function harmoniously, it does exert influence upon the management activities of constituent units. 6
6. Recently it has been argued that the quality of the ensuing concensus is positively
related to the degree of divergency of the initial views of constituent agencies up to
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II
STRUCTURE

The Directory of State Outdoor Recreation Administration, published as part of the ORRRC reports, was the point of departure
for identifying the objectives, internal structures, and powers of
the various state agencies. 7 It was apparent that the area of jurisdiction for most state agencies was not phrased in terms of an output,
such as outdoor recreation, but rather in terms of particular resources. The management perspective did not place initial priority
on recreation per se but rather on all possible uses for the resource
under a given agency's jurisdiction. Thus, in order to identify the
complete recreational resource management structure, it was necessary to consider all those agencies in charge of resources on which
outdoor recreation takes place.
The bulk of outdoor recreation activity involves resources which
can be grouped under three classifications: (1) land, (2) water,
and (3) wildlife. Land used for recreation activities was under the
auspices of two types of state agencies: parks and forests. Water
resources used mainly for recreation were usually managed by either
parks or fish and wildlife agencies. Fish and wildlife resources
were managed as a separate category.
The state agencies were grouped according to their jurisdiction
under the headings of parks, forests, or fish and wildlife. Characteristics which would describe either their objectives, line organization, or powers were then isolated for further examination. By this
procedure the predominant patterns for each agency category could
be more readily identified. Generalizations regarding forest agencies
must be qualified. Very little data were available regarding them,
and impressions are based upon characteristics of only the few
forest agencies described.
A. Objectives
One further comment on structure is necessary before discussing
objectives. In some states the three jurisdictional areas are administered by autonomous, single-resource units. In others, one agency
some point, which when surpassed, results in an inability to reach group decision. See
J. L. Bower, The Role of Conflict in Economic Decision-Making Groups: Some Empirical Results, 79 Q.J. Econ. 263 (1965).
7. U.S. Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Directory of State Outdoor Recreation Administration (ORRRC Study Report No. 14, 1962). Subsequent
references to objectives and structures of individual state agencies are documented in
this report.
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is in charge of all recreational resources in the state.8 The management jurisdictions of the single-purpose agencies necessarily are not
as comprehensive as those of the federated agencies. However, this
more limited area of jurisdiction is not necessarily a constraint upon
the range of variables considered for arriving at a particular set of
management objectives-termed the "planning scope." The allocation of a given resource among competing demands, including recreation, will depend upon the "product" transformation function of
that resource, the relative demand functions for those "products,"
and the availability of alternative production possibilities. All of
these must be included in the scope of planning for broadly stated
objectives. If an agency's objectives are limited to specific uses of
the single resource over which it has jurisdiction, this implies a
neglect of alternative and perhaps more efficient production possibilities as well as inadequate consideration of the demand function
for other types of recreation which are either complementary to, or
competitive with, the type of recreation derived from the given
resource.
1. Single-Resource Agencies
An examination of the objectives of most park, fish and game,
and forest agencies existing as separate entities reveals a narrowly
defined planning scope. The orientation is toward concrete management and operations programs-their development and regulation
of their use. The implication of such an objective formulation is
that the policy and planning functions take on a more narrow definition than that discussed in the first section of this Article. This implies a concern for the possible methods of providing certain designated types of recreation, and not their overall desirability relative
to other types, or of the relation of the given resource to other
resources capable of providing recreation.
A typical example of the objectives of fish and game agencies is
the following:
Enforce laws of State relating to encouragement, promotion, and
8. The single-agency pattern occurs in twenty-four states; the centralized agency,
in seventeen. In the remaining nine states, a combination of the two forms appears.
Some recreational resources are merged under one management while others are under
independent agencies. The states using centralized agencies are clustered in the north
central portion of the United States, with the exception of California, Alabama, and
a few Eastern states. The pattern used (individual agency or centralized) does not
seem to vary with any identifiable characteristic of the state, such as population density,
proportion of land under federal ownership, or geographic location.
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development of fishing interest and protection, propagation, and
distribution of fish.
Make rules and regulations for protection and use of fishery resources.
Manage State game lands, cooperative farm-game projects, game
farms, and game refuges.9

Such an objective implicitly assumes the present pattern of use will
be perpetuated, and the agency's job becomes one of seeing that
the resource is managed consistently with that expectation.
In contrast to most objectives of fish and game agencies is that of
the Texas Game and Fish Commission (the sole exception of the
above example) which is expressed in these terms: "to develop
and manage game, fish and marine mineral resources so that maximum economic and recreational value will accrue." This objective
allows for determination of those use patterns that will best achieve
the goal of "maximum economic and recreational value" and permits a reconsideration of programs and projects in the light of
changing economic and social conditions.
A fair assessment of forest agency objectives is impossible upon
the basis of the available data. Nor can their goals be inferred adequately from the activities presented in the source.
The objectives recorded for park agencies in contrast to those
of forest and fish and game agencies indicate that their conception of
management responsibility is in terms of the economic and social
demands placed upon their resource. However, their one response
to these demands is to provide state parks. Planning with this orientation amounts to selecting the appropriate level for this single
activity. This philosophy is exemplified by the following stated objective: "Provide recreational use of state natural resources. Preserve those natural resources by operating and maintaining the
State parks." 10 Some indication of a broader goal occurs in the case
of the Utah State Park and Recreation Commission; in addition to
the more usual goal of providing a system of state parks, there is
also an objective "to permit multiple use of State parks and other
areas under administration." The scope of this goal seems to hinge
on the characteristics of the areas under administration since a con9. Combined objectives of the Pennsylvania Fish Commission and Game Commission.
10. Stated objective of the Georgia Department of State Parks.

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 6

sideration of several uses in the selection of the areas is not implied."
2. Centralized Agencies
The objectives of state agencies encompassing in their jurisdiction all the activities occurring in fish and game, and parks and forests resources reveal considerable variation in planning scope. Some
of the objectives seem to be merely an aggregation of the objectives
of the individual agencies which have been gathered together under
a single command. The result is a collection of rather specific directives guiding the uses of the resources under their jurisdiction. For
example, one such directive is to:
Protect, propagate, and encourage the restoration of fish and game.
Develop and maintain the State park and memorial system.
Provide
2
fire protection to both public and private forest lands.'
These are clear examples of typical obpectives of single-purpose
fish and game, parks, and forest agencies, respectively.'
Other unified agencies reveal a broader orientation which allows
for adaptation to changing conditions. One of the broadest in scope
is the following: "Provide an adequate and flexible system for protection, development, and use of forests, fish, game, lakes, streams,
4
plant life, etc."'
B.

OrganizationalStructure
The internal structure of an agency, as well as its formal relations with other units in the administrative hierarchy, can constrain
the scope of both the planning and programming functions. An internal structure which does not furnish channels for coordination
and integration of various activities involved in the programming
and implementation functions prohibits broad objectives.
Conversely, some of the agencies observed in this study did possess an internal structure with the capability of implementing inte11. In several instances, the stated objectives of park agencies suggest that the
location of new parks is determined outside those agencies. In these instances, the
scope and definition of the planning function performed by the park agency is considerably reduced.
12. Stated objective of the Illinois Department of Conservation.
13. For example, the same aggregative objective could be obtained by simply adding together the stated objectives of the Arkansas Fish and Game Commission, the
New Mexico State Park Commission, and the Oregon State Department of Forestry.
14. Stated objective of the Wisconsin Conservation Department.
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grated management programs, yet professed objectives indicative
of restricted planning scope.' 5 In these cases, management can proceed without frustration, but the capabilities of the structure are
not being fully exercised.' 6
Virtually all of the agencies studied, whether with a single- or
multiple-resource jurisdiction, contain commissions in their internal
structure. 17 The line position of the commission is a key factor differentiating two general categories into which the internal structures of all the agencies fall.
In one of the two general structural types, the commission is
the supreme office of the agency responsible directly to the governor
and/or the legislature. The commission usually consists of two
types of membership: ex officio and citizens appointed by the governor, often with legislative approval. Generally, commission members receive no pay or nominal pay. Length of term in office varies
considerably, though the staggering of terms is common in almost
all cases.
The commission's concern, when it is the highest level unit within
the structure, focuses on the more general aspects of the agency's
responsibilities. The activation of programs is the duty of a director
appointed by the commission and responsible to it. He usually administers through a system of working divisions and a field organization. All but 5 of the approximately 80 single-resource agencies
examined use this type of internal structure.'" Of the 17 states with
centralized agencies, 8 have also adopted this form."
The second type of agency organization places the commission in
an advisory position to the office of the director, which becomes
the primary office. The details of commission membership and organization remain the same. The agency director reports to the
governor by whom he is appointed. This type of internal structure
15. The Illinois Department of Conservation; the Nebraska Game, Forestation,
and Parks Commission; and the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and Parks.
16. Compatibility between objectives and structures is a necessary condition for
efficient administration. However, it is not a sufficient one. Insufficient powers, inferior
personnel, and the composition of the external structure can limit and perhaps even
negate the advantages of consistency between objectives and internal structure.
17. The commissions under discussion here are distinct from regulatory commissions
oriented to a specific problem area and are also different from advisory commissions
which some centralized agencies possess on a division level.
18. The five exceptions are the Maine Department of Fisheries and Game, the
North Dakota State Game and Fish Department, the Kentucky Department of Parks,
the Georgia Department of State Parks, and the Maine Forest Service.
19. These are Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, South
Dakota, and Wisconsin.
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appears in 3 of the single-resource agencies and 3 of the 17 centralized agencies. 20 Six of the centralized agencies have no integrated
21
agency commission at all.

1. Commission Membership
The function of the commission in both structure types is primarily that of a coordinator of those parties having a vested interest in the agency's programs. 2 2 This is apparent from the ex
officio members and from membership requirements for citizen appointees. Ex officio members represent other state agencies while
citizens represent the particular agency's public. Equal political and
geographical representation of citizen appointees is required by all
states. The fact that the commission is always made up of people
outside the agency indicates the breadth which it adds to the agency's
administrative scope by affording access to sportsmen's associations
and other private groups directly affected by the management process.
Among the single-resource agencies, virtually no ex officio members are listed for any fish and game commission. Forest commissions, likewise, list no ex officio members. In sharp contrast is the
ex officio makeup of park commissions. The presence of high officials of fish and game and forest agencies on park commissions suggests that park agencies seek the assistance of these agencies in
managing the fish and game and forests, respectively, that appear
in state parks. However, fish and game and forest commissions do
not incorporate park agency directors in their membership. Park
commissions also reflect further coordination efforts on behalf of
park agencies. Directors of regional economic development commissions or similar organizations frequently appear in the list of
20. The three single-resources agencies are the Maine Department of Fish and
Game, the North Dakota State Game and Fish Department, and the Kentucky Department of Parks.
The three centralized agencies are the Illinois Department of Conservation, the
Indiana Department of Conservation, and the West Virginia Department of Natural
Resources.
21. These are the Alabama Department of Conservation, the California Resources
Agency, the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, the Minnesota De-

partment of Conservation, the New Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic
Development, and the New York Department of Conservation.
22. The conclusion that its function is merely one of coordination as opposed to
planning as defined earlier is based on the fact that (1) members are unpaid, (2)
meetings are held at infrequent intervals (once or twice a year on the average), and

(3) neither ex officio nor citizen member requirements reflect attention to gaining professional planning skills.
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ex officio members. Leaders of historical, tourist, and publicity
organizations are also ex officio members.
Citizen commission members are appointed to office by the governor with legislative approval. Requirements are usually general
for both single-resource and centralized agencies. Specific requirements pertain to only one or two members and are designed to gain
representation of certain economic activities in the state. The selection of the majority
of the citizen members is left to the discretion
23
of the governor.
2. Compatibility of Structures and Objectives
The degree of compatibility of structure and objectives can be
ascertained by looking at some of the centralized agencies. Of the
17 centralized agencies, 11 have structural arrangements which
appear amenable to broad, comprehensive objectives. Their commission is either advisory to the director or occupies the top position in the agency.2 4 This would suggest a centralization of planning as well as merely a structural centralization. Planning can be
done for the agency as a whole with consideration of all the activities within the agency's domain. Of these 11 agencies, 5 have goals
indicating the comprehensive orientation suggested by their structure.2 5 The other 6 have specific goals which could probably be
23. The New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development is
the only obvious instance of an attempt by an agency to establish a broad perspective
in its management through its commission membership. There are seven members
in all. They are chosen to represent manufacturing, agriculture, recreation, forestry,
general public, commerce, and public relations. It would be unfair to say that this was
the only example of breadth gained through commission appointees. The wide discretion, evidenced by the lack of specific requirements for most commission members,
that is permitted in appointments would certainly allow for the achievement of a broad
perspective through the selection of appropriate people. Whether or not this is actually
attained cannot be determined from available information.
24. The eleven centralized agencies with this type of internal structure are the
Illinois Department of Conservation; the Indiana Department of Conservation; the
Iowa State Conservation Commission; the Maryland Board of Natural Resources; the
Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources; the Michigan Department of Conservation; the Nebraska Game, Forestation, and Parks Commission; the Ohio Department of Natural Resources; the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and Parks;
the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources, and the Wisconsin Conservation
Department.
25. The stated objective of the Wisconsin Conservation Department has already
been stated in the text accompanying note 14 supra. The other four centralized agencies with stated objectives that indicate a relatively broad planning scope are the
Indiana Department of Conservation, the Iowa State Conservation Commission, the
Michigan Department of Conservation, and the West Virginia Department of Natural
Resources.
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attained without the coordinating devices provided by their structure.26
The structures of the remaining centralized agencies lack the capability possessed by their counterparts in other states for the attainment of comprehensive objectives.2 7 Nor do their objectives
reflect a broad planning scope. 28 It can be said that the objectives
and internal structures of these agencies are consistent. Yet, these
agencies do not meet the requirements of efficient management.
The structural inadequacy of these six agencies is dramatically
illustrated by a recent controversy in New York. A private power
company had applied to the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
for a license to build a power plant on the side of Storm King
Mountain, bordering the Hudson River, with an accompanying
reservoir which would back up into the Hudson Highlands. The
State Legislative Committee on Natural Resources held public hearings and asked the FPC to wait for passage on the application
until it could prepare its report to the legislature. The Federal
court recognized the primacy of the FPC over state laws and agencies, and the Agency's decision to proceed with the licensing was
upheld. 29 During the controversy, an editorial in the New York
Times stressed the need for a state agency that would take a broad
view of such situations and consider the role of both economic and
aesthetic factors.
In fact, a statewide agency does exist, but its structure does not
permit it to cope adequately with a situation of this kind, which
has not been placed under the jurisdiction of a single division or
regulatory commission of the agency. The New York Department
of Conservation appears to be an aggregation of individual agencies and commissions concerned with specific areas, united formally
under a single Commissioner of Conservation. There is no coordi26. For example, see the stated objective of the Illinois Department of Conservation
in text accompanying note 12 rupra.
27. These are the agencies with no agency-wide commissions: the Alabama Department of Conservation, the California Resources Agency, the Hawaii Department
of Land and Natural Resources, the Minnesota Department of Conservation, the New
Jersey Department of Conservation and Economic Development, and the New York
Department of Conservation.
28. For example, the stated objective of the Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources is to "manage state parks and historic sites," and to "manage and
administer the state's public lands, water, mineral, fish, game, and forest resources."
One of these six centralized agencies (California Resources Agency) has no stated
agency-wide objectives.
29. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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nating commission concerned with agency-wide affairs. (Three of
the divisions have commissions concerned with their own activities.)
The objectives of the agency are merely a summary of those for the
individual divisions. 30
With some modification of structure and administrative reorientation, New York could have a statewide agency with a broad view.
As this situation illustrates, there is not always time for the formation of an ad hoc committee to consider all the aspects and ramifications of a problem. An agency oriented toward the comprehensive
view will already be accustomed to thinking of resource use in
overall terms and can rise to the occasion in time of crisis or possibly avert such a crisis through its planning efforts.
C.

Powers
As previously emphasized, the compatibility of goals and structure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for administrative
efficiency. Among the other factors critical to administration are
the powers possessed by an agency. The implementation function
requires many activities, and the agency must have the legal powers
to engage in these activities. The powers granted to the agencies
in each of the three management categories were examined in order
to see what differences, if any, existed between the management
areas. It was discovered that, with the exception of fiscal powers,
there is little variation in the power granted. It would seem that,
although the management areas are quite different, program implementation in each requires similar activities.
An examination of fiscal powers, however, revealed some differences among the single-purpose agencies. Parks and forest agencies
obtain most of their funds from legislative appropriations out of
the state general fund. These are supplemented to a small degree
by funds from other sources such as appropriations of dedicated
revenues, bond issues, and occasionally the power to use directly
revenues from operations (timber sales, concession leases, boat
30. These objectives are to:
Establish and maintain an adequate system of parks.
Preserve, maintain, and utilize public forest lands, including forest preserves.
Protect and increase state's wildlife resources.
Promote safe use of motorboats.
Supervise use of water resources.
Promote conservation education.
Administer Saratoga Reservation.
Contrast this stated objective with that of the Wisconsin Conservation Department in
the text accompanying note 14 supra.
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rentals, and the like). These last sources make up a very small portion of the total budget. The heavy use of the appropriation process
implies substantial influences by state legislatures upon the programs,
operating procedures, and policies of these agencies.
The relative independence of fish and game agencies indicated
by their structural arrangement is further supported by their fiscal
situation. Very little of their total budget is appropriated through
the state general fund. Most of fish and game operations are supported by revenues generated from their activities. In many instances, collection and disbursement control remains with the
agency. Sometimes the revenues revert to a special fund in the state
treasury earmarked for appropriation to the agency. Another major
source of funds is that of federal grants. These do not pass through
the state legislature but proceed directly from the grantor to the
agency. The almost complete lack of responsibility to state legislatures on fiscal matters which fish and game agencies enjoy implies a
greater degree of autonomy relative to parks and forest agencies.
With no legislative budget control, fish and game agencies are essentially free to plan and implement their own programs. Any consideration of their programs in relation to those of other management organizations must take place on their own initiative unless
other factors in the administrative process bring about integrated
planning.
III
EVALUATION

In the previous section, five key structural patterns have been
identified from among state agencies with management responsibilities for land and water recreational resources. These are:
1. Unified structure, capable of broad operation, with broadly defined mission.
2. Unified structure, capable of broad operation, with narrowly de-

fined mission.
3. Unified structure, not capable of broad operation, with narrowly defined mission.
4. Nonunified structure with narrowly defined mission.
5.

Nonunified structure with broadly defined mission.8 1

31. Examples of the five structure types are: (1) Wisconsin Conservation Department; (2) Illinois Department of Conservation; (3) New York Department of Conservation; (4) Kentucky Department of Parks, and (5) Texas Game and Fish Commission.
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These structural patterns are evaluated in terms of criteria related to the planning, programming, and implementation phases of
the management process.
Two criteria are used to test the efficiency of the organizational
structure for planning the management of recreational resources.
The first of these is in terms of the planning scope. Broad scope is
required so that land and water management for recreation is
planned in light of the interresource relationships that create economies of scale, or externalities with inherent economies or diseconomies. Using a production function analogy, adequacy of the planning scope implies that any economies inherent in resource interrelationships can be realized by the management program. A second
criterion is that the management organizations have access to
groups representing the principal categories of recreational demand
that might be served. The management plan is efficient only if formulated in terms of the most efficient production function and with
knowledge of the composition and magnitude of ultimate demand.
These two criteria-broad administrative scope and access to recreational demand groups-will test the management structure in this
regard.
Criteria to test the programming efficiency of the organizational
structure also can be developed. Here, again, a broad scope is required to guarantee that the least-cost methods are used to meet
recreational management objectives. This refers to a more technical level of coordination than is required for planning. A second
programming criterion is that there be adequate authority to require common definitions and criteria for analyzing alternative
management schemes. The need for this is self-evident, yet surprisingly few states appear to have this authority as an attribute of
their organizational structure. A third criterion for programming
is concerned with the staging of specific management proposals.
This requires a capacity to communicate with interest groups regarding particular management measures to ascertain any local
problems that their implementation might entail.
The implementation phase of the management process requires
a well-articulated field organization and the requisite powers to
engage in facility construction, maintenance, and regulation. Generally, the structures studied had a broad array of powers and, at
least on paper, a field organization. Therefore, no criteria will be
used to evaluate structural types for their potential efficiency in implementing a management program.
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It is only possible to formulate these criteria in attributive terms.
One can determine whether the organization structures possess these
important attributes, and each of the five structural types are
evaluated in this fashion.
The first criterion requires a broad perspective within which objectives are conceived and determined. A single-resource agency
must determine its particular management objectives with knowledge of the total demand for the recreational activities that can
be produced by the resource over which its has management responsibilities. It must also know alternative possibilities for satisfying
that demand. The objective of only one single-resource agency
(Texas Game and Fish Commission) implied a perspective approaching the desired breadth. The structure of the unified agencies
lends itself more easily to the attainment of this broad perspective
because of the integration of the several management areas. Yet,
of the 17 states adopting this form of structure, the objectives of
only 5 were spelled out in sufficiently broad terms to indicate that
82
this is being done.
With respect to the accessibility of groups representing recreational demand, there is evidence that through commission membership, the voice of certain demand groups is instrumental in the
management process. This is most evident for the single-resource
agencies with narrow objectives. In particular, fish and game agencies with a substantial portion of commission membership consisting
of representatives of sportsmen's organizations are the best example of access to demand groups. However, this is only one segment of recreation demand, and the structure of the single-resource
agencies does not reflect a capacity for incorporating total demand
into their planning activities. Here again, it is the unified agencies
which possess the potential for creating access to all demand groups,
particularly the few unified agencies which have broad objectives.
However, from the available data, it is not evident that their potential is being exercised.
The third criterion is a broad technical scope to permit consideration of all relevant program alternatives. Once again the unified agencies are best equipped to gain the necessary technical
competence. The pool of technical skill open to a unified agency is
large, for people possessing skills unique to particular recreational
32. The Wisconsin Conservation Department, the Indiana Department of Conservation, the Iowa State Conservation Commission, the Michigan Department of Conservation, and the West Virginia Department of Natural Resources.
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activities can be drawn together from any of the specific areas. The
range of alternative methods which programmers can consider as
feasible is also broader in the unified structure. This is due in part
to the fact that these structures imply adequate authority to require
member divisions to undertake specified management programs
rather than having to rely upon cooperative agreement among equal
status agencies.
The use of a common set of analytical rules for programming,
the fourth criterion, can possibly be achieved by both the unified
and nonunified agencies. However, it is unlikely that common analytical procedures would be adopted voluntarily by single-resource
agencies, particularly those with narrow objectives. The analytical
procedures used by these agencies would tend to favor their own
objectives by giving inadequate weight to all alternative recreational uses. A recreational code requiring adoption of common
analytical procedures by all single-purpose agencies in a state would
be necessary. In a unified agency, uniform procedures can be built
readily into the rules of organization, and their enforcement is
easier to accomplish.
The fifth criterion for evaluating management structure is the
creation of capacity to communicate to all interest groups. The
evidence would suggest that the single-resource agencies are achieving this through their commission memberships. However, when a
program involves more than one single-resource agency there is the
danger that two agencies of equal status may be involved in a conflict which can paralyze implementation of a particular management project. Conversely, the unified agency possesses a structure
which can bring interest group opinions into the early stages of programming. There is some evidence that this is being done through
the placement of representatives of various economic activities on
central commissions.
CONCLUSION

The five evaluation criteria used above reveal major areas of
strength and weakness in the recreational management process. It
would appear that the greatest advantage of the single-resource
agencies is their ease of access to the demand groups and interest
groups particular to their area of jurisdiction. However, their limitations with respect to the other three criteria-broad planning
scope, a wide range of technical competence, and common analytical
practices-severely limit their ability to use their advantage of
access, especially in planning activities.
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The strengths of the unified agencies lie in those areas where
the single-resource agencies are weakest, namely, planning scope,
technical competence, and uniform analytical procedures. In addition, they have the potential for establishing communication to demand groups and interest groups. Unified agencies possess a
broader technical scope generally, have adopted a common analytical procedure, and have established, at least to some degree, access
to interest groups. The unified agencies have taken definite steps to
create the conditions under which effective programming can be
achieved.
As for the planning function, the five unified agencies with broad
objectives are the only indication of efforts to obtain a broad planning scope. The remaining unified agencies show very little breadth;
and the single-resource agencies, almost without exception, seem to
phase into the management process on the programming level,
omitting planning almost entirely. This raises the question of
whether the most widely used structure for management is adequately equipped for planning. The unified agencies would appear
to possess planning potential, but the fact remains that practically
none of them have taken steps in this direction.
Perhaps the most pressing question requiring further investigation is how to achieve a sufficiently broad planning scope. In beginning such an investigation, one should consider the five unified
agencies with broad objectives which have made the initial effort
in this direction. 8 Their successes and failures would indicate
whether this broad planning scope can in fact be attained within the
context of a unified state recreational resource management agency
or whether planning should be undertaken by an organization somewhere else in the administrative hierarchy. If a separate organization seems to be appropriate, should it be located on the state level
or should it be on a regional or federal level? This problem currently is being debated with respect to the recreational implications
of recent proposals for multi-state Western water development that
were stimulated by the Interior Department's Pacific Southwest
4
Water Plan.
33. Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, West Virginia, and Indiana.
34. The addition of a separate planning organization to the administrative hierarchy would have definite advantages; the most obvious advantage would be the
ability to plan the use of all recreational resources. The management role of the various components of the administrative hierarchy (county, state, federal, and private
organizations) in a given project could also be viewed by a separate planning organization with greater perspective than is possible when planning takes place within these
component units. The feasibility of such an organization rests most heavily on whether
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The adequacy of the state organizational structure for management of recreational resources must eventually rely on the analysis
of performance data. This would, among other things, reveal to
what extent informal channels have been created to overcome the
structural limitations pointed out in this analysis.
The present study infers what performances would be, based
upon the formal description of the organizations involved and their
mission. Only occasional anecdotal material has been available for
testing the validity of this inference. The performance of each type
of structure needs to be observed directly.
The economic analysis of alternatives for recreational resources
management is particularly difficult. Past traditions and institutions
have prevented market expressions of value. We as yet know little
about the relationship between recreation and other uses of land
and water resources; consequently, management cost functions are
difficult to determine. This indeterminateness means that it will be
difficult to achieve management efficiency simply by requiring the
use of standards, criteria, and analytical procedures even though
rigorously defined. Constituent units within the management structure will be faced with many decisions-economically important
decisions-that will have to be analyzed and resolved on an ad hoc
basis. Under these circumstances, selection of an appropriate structure is of particular economic importance. Although data limitations
have necessitated using rather crude analytical techniques,. further
studies of this type appear worthwhile, and with the gradual accumulation of data on performance, specific recommendations for
improving the management structure will be possible.

or not its plan will be activated by the implementing organizations. The problems of
activation are critical to determining its position in the administrative hierarchy
(sufficient authority to insure activation may only be possible with a federal rather
than a state or regional organization) and to its personal composition (the inclusion
of representatives from action agencies in the planning process may increase their
willingness to implement recommended plans).

